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ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS
V . FILIPE MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND YIANNIS VAILAKIS
The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of ﬁnancial asset eco-
nomies with transactions costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and
reﬂect agents decisions of intermediating ﬁnancial activities at the expense of providing labor
services. An equilibrium is shown to exist in the case of real asset structures.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Transactions costs such as, brokerage commissions, market impact costs1 and
transaction taxes are an inherent feature of modern ﬁnancial markets. Researchers
have questioned the impact of transaction costs on ﬁnancial markets focusing par-
ticularly on the way these costs affect the trading behavior of market participants
as well as on the role they have in determining equilibrium prices and trading vol-
ume in asset markets. Proponents of transactions costs argue that their presence
discourage destabilizing speculation that can threaten high employment and price
stability. For instance, imposing higher transacting rates to investors with short-
term horizon may reduce the trading and inﬂuence of those investors on the market
allowing investors with a long horizon to engage in investment strategies that pro-
mote research and development (see Stiglitz (1989)). In addition, the presence of
transaction costs may diminish the activities of noise traders. Because the actions
of those traders are not based on information about underlying values, their trades
may drive prices away from their intrinsic value, reducing price informativeness
while increasing volatility. Opponents of transaction costs argue for a careful design
of transacting rates. High rates may affect price discovery, in the sense that can make
prices less informative. They may also have negative effects on market liquidity2 by
causing competing, informed traders to scale back their trades (see Subrahmanyam
(1998b) and Subrahmanyam (1998a)). Therefore, transactions costs may reduce
overall market efﬁciency and cause a misallocation of resources. The magnitude of
the aforementioned effects is still subject to considerable controversy and discus-
sion. Solid empirical evidence is required to establish which effects dominate in the
real world (see Jones and Seguin (1997), Habermeier and Kirilenko (2003), Hau
(2006)).
Roughly speaking, theoretical models dealing with the implications of transac-
tion costs in ﬁnancial markets have their roots in two broad branches of economic
literature: dynamic asset pricing theory and general equilibrium theory.
1The market impact cost occurs because the transaction itself may change the market price of the
asset. The difference between the transaction price and what the market price would have been in the
absence of the transaction is termed the market impact of the transaction. The market impact is a price-
per-share amount. Multiplying the market impact by the number of shares traded gives the market impact
cost of the transaction.
2Market liquidity corresponds to the ease with which market participants can transact, or the ability
of markets to absorb large purchases or sales without much effect on prices.
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Contributions on asset pricing under transaction costs include partial equilibrium
models of optimal portfolio design (see Magill and Constantinides (1976), Constan-
tinides (1986), Dufﬁe and Sun (1990)) as well as general equilibrium models of
endogenous price formation (see Vayanos (1998), Lo, Mamysky, and Wang (2004)).
Transaction costs have also been proposed (see Heaton and Lucas (1986), Aiyagari
and Gertler (1991), Aiyagari (1993)) as an explanation to various asset pricing puz-
zles that emerge in empirical literature (e.g. the equity premium puzzle, Mehra and
Prescott (1985)).
Transaction costs were originally introduced in the standard general equilibrium
model of Arrow and Debreu (1954) in order to explain the sequential opening of
commodity markets.3 The traditional approach to transaction costs assumes that
real resources are used in the process of transaction. Early studies visualize mar-
ket as a proﬁt maximizing intermediary who uses real resources to transform sold
goods into bought goods according to an exogenously speciﬁed technology. Hahn
(1971) and Hahn (1973) refer to such a technology as the transaction technology
for the economy. Kurz (1974a) and Kurz (1974b) push the theory further by al-
lowing traders to have their own exchange technology. Shefrin (1981) introduced
uncertainty to account for the possibility of inactive future markets.
Further developments encompass economies with incomplete ﬁnancial markets
and transaction costs. Repullo (1987) shows that the set of equilibria in a Radner
(1972) economy with incomplete markets coincides with the set of equilibria of a
Kurz (1974a) economy where agents have a special kind of transaction technol-
ogy.4 Laitenberger (1996) considers a model where transaction costs take the form
of real resources that are used to enforce ﬁnancial contracts. From the angle of a
buyer transaction costs induce a reduce real claim on assets while from the angle
of a seller they induce an increased real obligation. In this setting transactions costs
are incurred at the second period and their level is exogenously speciﬁed. In a re-
cent paper Arrow and Hahn (1999) have shown that in sequential economies with
transactions costs equilibria are always constrained Pareto-inefﬁcient even in cases
where security-payoffs span the set of all states of nature.5 Jin and Milne (1999)
(see also Milne and Neave (2003)) propose a model where ﬁnancial activities are
intermediated by some brokers/intermediaries that trade assets between buyers and
sellers using a costly technology. The intermediaries act competitively taking buying
and selling prices as given. They also are allowed to hold portfolios and trade on
their own account. At equilibrium their revenues are eventually redistributed back
to consumers. 6
3In the classical multi-period Arrow-Debreu economy, agents’ trading opportunities are not affected
by opening markets at futures dates.
4Each agent has a transaction technology that assigns zero cost if at some date-event the markets are
open, and inﬁnite otherwise.
5Herings and Schmedders (2006) provide an algorithm for the computation of equilibria in an partic-
ular economy with one good (wealth).
6There are two issues that arise in the framework proposed by Jin and Milne (1999). First, in an
environment where the outcome of production activity is uncertain and ﬁnancial markets are incomplete,
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An alternative to real costs approach argues for commission fees derived from the
monopolistic power of a privately owned brokerage house. In this setting the trans-
acting cost is interpreted as an intermediation cost since it only implies a transfer of
income across individuals (no real resources are used in the process of transaction).
Préchac (1996) considers a model where a privately owned brokerage house acts
as an intermediary charging an exogenous commission fee on all selling and buy-
ing orders. The commissions are subsequently redistributed to consumers according
to their equity shares. In Préchac (1996) the commission fee is proportional to the
value of trade. This may be problematic when assets have non-positive returns.7
Markeprand (2008) allows for arbitrary asset returns and for a general intermedia-
tion cost function that takes into account the volume of trade. Both Préchac (1996)
and Markeprand (2008) deal with real asset markets. In both models intermediation
costs serve to bound endogenously portfolios, ruling out situations where equilib-
ria fail to exist (see Hart (1975)). Dufﬁe and Shafer (1985) and Dufﬁe and Shafer
(1986) showed that Hart’s example is an exception and that the existence of Radner
equilibrium is assured generically. However, subsequent contributions showed that
the generic existence argument is no more valid in cases where asset dividends are
not linear with respect to prices (see Polemarchakis and Ku (1990)) or preferences
are not strictly convex (see Busch and Govindan (2004)).
Préchac (1996) and Markeprand (2008) don’t provide any rationale for the level
of intermediation costs. The bid-ask spread in their models is speciﬁed outside the
functioning of the economy. Moreover, there is no market for equity shares and their
initial distribution is exogenous. In an interesting paper Bisin (1998) addresses
these shortcoming. He considers a model where intermediaries have a monopoly
power in a ﬁx number of security markets. Intermediaries act as a monopolist choos-
ing optimally the securities’ payoffs8 and the bid-ask spread they charge. Interme-
diation involves ﬁxed costs as well as costs that are proportional to trading volume.
Equilibrium prices and asset demands are rationally anticipated by intermediaries
when evaluating their proﬁts. In this setting, strategic interaction (Bertrand compe-
tition) among ﬁrms leads to endogenous bid-ask spreads.
The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative general equilibrium formulation
of ﬁnancial asset economies with transactions costs. As in Bisin (1998) we believe
that a model with transaction costs should provide an economic rationale for the
emergence of these costs. Bisin (1998) proposed an explanation based on Bertrand
competition among monopolists. We follow another route and explain how trans-
action costs can emerge endogenously at equilibrium in a competitive market of
among the share holders on the objective assigned to the ﬁrm. Second, assets pay in unspeciﬁed units of
account (i.e. the asset structure is nominal). This in turn raises a number of serious questions. What is
the role of these units of account? Are they related to a system of monetary equations that specify the
amount of money that is available for transactions? If this is the case, then money is not neutral and
can affect price levels at equilibrium. In sequential markets the assumption of perfect foresight amounts
to assuming that agents correctly anticipate current and future monetary policy. One can refer to Magill
and Quinzii (1996) for a thorough discussion on both issues.
7In Préchac (1996) returns are non-negative.
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brokers.9
Consistent with the traditional approach of modeling transaction costs, we ar-
gue for real transaction costs. We feel, however, that in its early formulation the
real cost approach is not suited to the study of ﬁnancial markets. On the other side
it is unreasonable to neglect any form of real transaction costs as Préchac (1996)
and Markeprand (2008) do. Although some physical inputs are burnt in the trans-
action process,10 empirical evidence reports that the ﬁnancial sector is more labor
intensive. Indeed, when comparing the labor cost ﬁgures for ﬁnancial intermedi-
ation with those for the whole economy it is clear that the former are in many
cases higher than the latter (see Carley (2002)). In addition, the ﬁnancial sector
in developed economies exhibits higher wage differentials with respect to other
industry-speciﬁc sectors (see Genre, Momferatou, and Mourre (2005)). It is there-
fore reasonable to think that an important part of the costs generated in modern
ﬁnancial markets are associated with the provision of labor services required to in-
termediate the ﬁnancial activities. From this perspective real transaction costs can
be viewed as the individual opportunity cost of labor or effort.
We formulate a two-period ﬁnancial asset economy with endogenous transaction
costs that reﬂect agents decisions of intermediating ﬁnancial activities at the ex-
pense of providing labor services. In that respect our formulation is close to Kurz
(1974a) and Kurz (1974b) in the sense that transactions are directly employed by
consumers.
There is a ﬁxed number of real assets available for trade. Each agent is character-
ized by a consumption and investment set as well as by an abstract set representing
his available labor or effort. Agents’ actions involve three activities. The exchange
of commodity goods, the purchase or sale of assets and the intermediation of ﬁ-
nancial orders. The demand for commodities is determined by the prices of goods.
Investment decisions are driven by security prices and the commission fee per unit
of transactions. The choice of supplying labor to intermediate transactions is de-
termined by the price of labor (salaries). The provision of labor services implies a
revenue that agents can dispose in the consumption of goods but simultaneously it
incurs a loss in utility due to the reduction in leisure. Consumers can intermediate
in any security market and can act simultaneously as investors and intermediaries.
We assume that there are no barriers to entry in intermediating ﬁnancial activi-
ties. The entry costs are low enough such that any agent can be a potential broker.11
9The empirical assessments on the competitiveness of ﬁnancial sector in speciﬁc economies is mixed.
Shaffer (1989) and Shaffer (1993) present results that strongly reject collusive conduct and support
perfect competition in U.S. and Canada while Shaffer (2001) reports that European banks appear to
suffer from a measurable but limited degree of banking market power. Evidence from Battelino (2008)
suggests that the Australian ﬁnancial sector is competitive. Bandt and Davis (2000) ﬁnd that the U.S.
banking sector is highly competitive whereas in some European countries like Germany and France the
banking system is characterized by monopolistic competition.
10For instance, the use of capital goods like computers, the rent of infrastructures, etc.
11Modeling explicitly entry costs leads to non-convex action sets. This is because the consumers’
maximization problem involves a choice variable that takes discrete values: one value represents the
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Therefore, instead of considering that there is a ﬁnite set of brokerage houses with
monopoly power, we assume that brokers act competitively in the sense that there
is a competitive market for their labor services. In this setting, the price of labor
coincides with the commission fee at equilibrium. This in turn implies that the com-
mission fee is endogenously determined, reﬂecting agents’ productivity of interme-
diating transactions and their intratemporal preferences for labor and leisure.
The paper is structure as follows. In Section 2 we present the model, introduce
notation and assumptions and deﬁne agents’ objectives. In section 3 we present
the concept of the competitive equilibrium, highlight its properties and prove its
existence. Section 4 is technical in nature and is devoted to prove an intermediate
result (i.e. existence of equilibria with bounded action sets) that is used in the proof
of our main existence theorem. Section 5 relates our work with the literature on
exogenous intermediation costs and in particular with the models of Préchac (1996)
and Markeprand (2008). We argue that both models are incomplete since they do
not provide any rational for the level of commission fees. An attempt to make the
choice of commission fees endogenous in Préchac (1996) raises serious difﬁculties
that stem from the fact that proﬁts depend on the equilibrium outcome which in
turn depends on the level of the chosen commission fees. The problem becomes
more serious in the setting proposed by Markeprand (2008). The speciﬁcation of his
cost function induces a budget restriction at t = 0 that is no longer homogeneous of
degree zero with respect to prices. This may raise questions about the normalization
of prices that already appear in the literature of ﬁnancial markets with nominal
assets while simultaneously may jeopardize the existence of equilibrium.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a pure exchange economy that extends over two periods t ∈ {0,1}.
There is exogenous uncertainty about consumers’ characteristics at t = 1 repre-
sented by a ﬁnite set S of events. Markets open sequentially. The economy consists
of a ﬁnite set I of agents, indexed by i ∈ I. Each consumer i has unlimited abilities to
form expectations and thus can perfectly forecast endogenous macroeconomic vari-
ables. At every period t there is a ﬁnite set Lt of commodities available for trade. Let
X i
t ⊂ Xt ≡ R
Lt
+ denote agent i’s set of commodity bundles available for consumption
and Pt ≡ R
Lt
+ denote the set of commodity prices at period t.
At the ﬁrst period t = 0 consumers can trade commodities and a ﬁnite set J of
ﬁnancial assets. The ﬁnancial structure is assumed to be exogenous. The payoff of
asset j in state s, denominated in units of account, is given by Vj(p1(s),s) where
p1(s) is the commodity price prevailing in that state. In order to avoid issues related
to monetary policies, we restrict our attention to real assets.
a broker. In such a setting the salary should be such that the entry costs of those who decided to be
brokers have to be compensated by the utility of the goods they can consume using the revenue from
the commission fees. One could deal with non-convexities by introducing a setting with a continuum of
agents. While such a formulation is interesting, tackling the existence problem becomes technically more
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ASSUMPTION 2.1 The payoffs of each asset j are real in the sense that for each state
s, the function Vj( ,s) : P1 → R is homogenous of degree 1, i.e.,
∀λ ∈ R+, ∀p1(s) ∈ P1, Vj(λp1(s),s) = λVj(p1(s),s).
Moreover, we assume that the function Vj( ,s) : P1 → R is continuous.
REMARK 2.1 In contrast with Préchac (1996) we don’t impose that asset payoffs are
non-negative. As in Markeprand (2008) we relax the assumption of linear depen-
dent payoff-functions to allow for general assets like (real) options12 and futures.
However, we rule out nominal assets.
At t = 0, each agent chooses to purchase an amount θj ¾ 0 and to sale an
amount ϕj ¾ 0 of asset j. Let Θi ⊂ Θ ≡ RJ
+ denote the space of available purchases
and Φi ⊂ Φ ≡ RJ
+ the space of available sales. We let Q = RJ
+ be the space of asset
prices at t = 0.
ASSUMPTION 2.2 For each i, the sets Θi and Φi are closed and convex. Moreover,
every agent i is allowed to sell or purchase a small amount of each asset, i.e.,
∃v ∈ R
J
++, [0,v] ⊂ Θ
i ∩Φ
i.
We assume that markets for consumption are frictionless: there are no transaction
costs. However, purchasing or selling assets requires the intermediation of ﬁnancial
brokers. Every agent i is a potential broker. He is characterized by an abstract set Y i
representing potential labor or effort and a function f i : Y i → RJ
+ representing his
production function. If agent i chooses a level of effort y, then he can intermediate
a volume f i
j (y) of ﬁnancial transactions for each asset j. We assume that agent i’s
ability to intermediate transactions is asset-dependent but independent of the type
of transactions: buying or selling.
Each agent i has a utility/disutility function Ui
0 : X0 × Y i → R for consumption
and labor at t = 0 and an initial endowment of goods ei
0 ∈ X0. For each possible
realization of exogenous uncertainty s at t = 1, agent i has a utility function Ui
1( ,s) :
X1 → R for consumption at t = 1 and an initial endowment ei
1(s) ∈ X1. At t = 0
agent i discounts future consumption with a discount factor βi > 0 and has beliefs
about exogenous uncertainty represented by a probability νi ∈ Prob(S).
ASSUMPTION 2.3 Every agent i considers that every state of nature s is probable,
i.e.,
∀s ∈ S, ν
i(s) > 0.
12Consider that there is an asset j which dividend in state s is the market value of a bundle Aj(s) ∈ R
L1
+ .
Our framework allows for a call option on this asset with strike the market value of a ﬁxed bundle
ξ ∈ R
L1
+ . The dividend of this call option in state s is given by [p1(s)   Aj(s) − p1(s)   ξ]+ where p1(s) is
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Purchasing or selling assets induces a commission fee that is paid to those agents
who act as intermediaries (brokers). The decision of participating in the intermedi-
ation process involves the devotion of working time. For a ﬁxed volume of ﬁnancial
transactions, different agents may need a different level of labor to intermediate this
volume. We assume that there are no barriers to entry in intermediating ﬁnancial
activities. The entry costs are low enough such that any agent can be a potential
broker. At equilibrium the wage (the price of labor) received by brokers for the pro-
vision of their labor services will coincide with the commission fee paid by investors.
Therefore, in our framework the commission fee is endogenously determined, re-
ﬂecting agents’ productivity of intermediating transactions and their intratemporal
preferences for labor and leisure. We denote by κj ∈ R the salary paid to each bro-
ker for intermediating a unit of asset j. Given the previous discussion, κj is also the
transaction cost paid by investors per unit of asset j’s purchase or sale.
It is assumed that the transacting costs are proportional to the volume of transac-
tions a consumer/broker can intermediate. We allow for the possibility of an agent
to be simultaneously an investor (purchasing or selling an asset j) and a broker
(intermediating exchanges of asset j).
When agent i chooses at t = 0 to consume xi
0 and supplies the labor/effort yi, he
gets the payoff Ui
0(xi
0, yi) and intermediates the vector zi = f i(y j) of asset trans-
actions. We propose to represent agent i’s action by the couple (xi
0,zi) of consump-
tion/intermediation instead of the couple (xi
0, yi) of consumption/effort. We denote




i) ⊂ Z ≡ R
J
+.
ASSUMPTION 2.4 The production set Zi is a closed convex subset of RJ
+. Moreover,
inaction is possible, i.e., 0 ∈ Zi and every agent is able to make an effort sufﬁcient
to produce a non-negative amount of transactions for each asset, i.e.,
∃v ∈ R
J
++, [0,v] ⊂ Z
i.
We subsequently deﬁne the payoff that agent i obtains when he chooses an action
(xi
0,zi) in the feasible set X i

















REMARK 2.2 If there is a topological structure on the effort space Y i such that Y i
is compact and the production function f i is continuous, then the continuity of the
(indirect) payoff Πi
0 follows from the continuity of Ui
0.
In what follows we abstract from speciﬁc assumptions on the space Y i and con-
sider that agent i is characterized by a function Πi
0 : X0 × Z → [−∞,+∞) where
Z ≡ RJ
+. We make the following assumptions on preferences and endowments.8 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
ASSUMPTION 2.5 For each agent i,














(b) the payoff function Πi
0 : X0 × Z → [−∞,∞) is continuous, concave, strictly
increasing in consumption x0 and strictly decreasing in production z;
(c) the utility function Ui
1( ,s) is continuous, concave and strictly increasing.
Consider a consumption plan xi = (xi
0, xi
1) ∈ X i and a production vector zi ∈ Zi.
The expected discounted payoff of the action ai = (xi
0,zi, xi





















We assume that higher levels of production give rise to lower expected payoffs, that














One may consider the following representation of the payoff Πi
0:







0 : X0 → [−∞,∞) is continuous, concave and strictly increasing and the
function Ei : Z → [0,∞) is continuous, convex, strictly increasing and satisﬁes
Ei(0) = 0. While the set Zi represents the production capacities of agent i, the
amount Ei(z) represents the negative impact in terms of utility of the effort to in-
termediate the vector z of transactions.
REMARK 2.3 Observe that the payoff function Πi
0 is deﬁned on the whole space





and the contingent utility function Ui




while agent i’s actions may be restricted to strict subsets
X
i
0 ⊂ X0, Z
i ⊂ Z and X
i
1 ⊂ X1.
These restrictions may be problematic if agents are satiated on some feasible con-
sumption plans. To avoid this problem, we make the following non-satiation as-
sumption.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 9
ASSUMPTION 2.6 The restrictions on each agent’s consumption sets do not prevent
them to purchase the aggregate endowment, i.e.,














1, ∀s ∈ S.
We denote by Ai









and we denote by Ai







The set Ai = Ai
0×Ai
1 represents the set of intertemporal actions available for agent i.
3. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM




of commodity prices p0 ∈ P0, asset prices q ∈ Q and transaction costs/salaries
κ ∈ RJ
+;
• a family of perfectly anticipated future prices
p1 = (p1(s))s∈S


























is the vector of perfectly anticipated consumption bundles, such that
(3.1) p0   x
i
0 +(q +κ) θ
i ¶ p0   e
i
0 +(q −κ) ϕ
i +κ z
i
and for each s ∈ S,
(3.2) p1(s)  x
i
1(s)+ V(p1(s),s) ϕ
i ¶ p1(s)  e
i
1(s)+ V(p1(s),s) θ
i.10 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
The set of all actions satisfying the budget restrictions (3.1) and (3.2) is called the
budget set and denoted by
B
i(p,q,κ).





















































(a) actions are optimal, i.e.,
(3.3) ∀i ∈ I, a
i ∈ argmax{Π
i(a) : a ∈ B
i(p,q,κ)}






















(c) asset markets clear, i.e.,























Before presenting general conditions that ensure existence of a competitive equi-
librium, we propose to underly some of its properties.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 11
DEFINITION 3.2 The asset structure is said non-degenerate and positive if for every
possible vector of expected strictly positive prices (p1(s))s∈S
13 and for every asset j,
payoffs are non-negative
∀s ∈ S, Vj(p1(s),s) ¾ 0
and non-degenerate
∃sj ∈ S, Vj(p1(sj),sj) > 0.
REMARK 3.1 If each asset j promises to deliver the units of account corresponding
to the market value of a bundle Aj(s) contingent to state s, then the asset structure
is non-degenerate and positive if Aj(s) belongs to R
L1
+ and for at least one state sj
the promise Aj(sj) is not zero.










++ and p1(s) ∈ R
L1
++, ∀s ∈ S.
Assume that the asset structure is non-degenerate and positive. If there are no re-
strictions on portfolios, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I, Θ
i = Θ and Φ
i = Φ




In that case we can reinterpret our model by considering that transaction costs
and salaries are proportional to transaction values instead of volumes. Indeed, let
c = (cj)j∈J be deﬁned by




The number cj represents the transaction cost paid by investors per unit of account
invested or borrowed on asset j. The budget set at t = 0 can be rewritten in the
following way:
(3.7) p0   x0 +
 
j∈J











13In the sense that p1(s) ∈ R
L1
++.12 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
This budget set is similar to the one proposed by Préchac (1996). Two main differ-
ences are in order. In Préchac (1996) the cost cj is an exogenous parameter and the
“reward” of each agent i is a ﬁxed share on the proﬁts of a monopolistic brokerage
house. We will highlight these differences in Section 5.
Observe that if cj > 1 in the budget restriction (3.7) then there is a problem.14 An
interesting property of our equilibrium is that, provided that there is trade in asset
j, the cost cj is endogenously determined at a level strictly lower than 1. Indeed,








The transaction cost κj must necessarily be strictly lower than the asset price qj.
By way of contradiction, assume that it is not the case, i.e., qj ¶ κj. There exists at
least one agent k that is selling an amount ϕk
j > 0 of that asset. By doing so, he is
paying at t = 0 the amount κj − qj in exchange of the obligation to deliver non-
negative amounts in every state and a strictly positive amount in state sj.15 Agent
k would be better-off canceling his sales and replacing them by strictly positive
consumption at least in state sj. This contradicts the optimality of action ak. The
above reasoning illustrates the importance of allowing the transaction costs to be
determined endogenously and not to be ﬁxed exogenously as in Préchac (1996) and
Markeprand (2008). We come back on this issue in Section 5. In particular, we argue
that the lack of a rationale for specifying the level of transaction costs in the models
of Préchac (1996) and Markeprand (2008) raises a number of serious questions.









is said particular if
• there is only one good at t = 0 and in every state s at t = 1;
• for each agent i,
– there are no restrictions, i.e.,
X
i
0 = X0, X
i
1 = X1, Θ
i = Θ, Φ
i = Φ and Z
i = Z;
– the payoff function Πi
0 is decomposed as follows:






14In Préchac (1996) it is not explicitly assumed that the exogenous cost parameter should satisfy
cj ¶ 1.
15Remember that in state sj we have Vj(p1(sj),sj) > 0.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 13
– the function Ui
0 is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave
on [0,∞), differentiable on (0,∞), and satisﬁes an Inada’s condition at








– for each asset j, there exists a function zj  → Ei
j(zj) differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly convex on [0,∞) such that








j(zj) represents the loss in terms of utility due to the effort required to
intermediate a volume zj of asset j.
Assume that the economy is particular. Let (π,a) be a competitive equilibrium
with













Since the function x0  → Πi
0(x0,zi) is strictly increasing, we can assume without any
loss of generality that p0 = 1. Fix an asset j for which there exists trade. Then, there
exists at least one agent i such that zi
j > 0. From the Inada’s condition we have
xi









At equilibrium, the salary for intermediation of one unit of asset j equals the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between the disutility of effort and the utility of consump-
tion.
When there are no transaction costs, existence of equilibrium is not ensured. The
non-existence arises form the discontinuity of demand for assets when commod-
ity prices converge to prices for which the payoff matrix drops in rank (see Hart
(1975)). We provide a framework where transaction costs may imply the existence
of an ex-ante bound on individually rational and physically feasible portfolios. In
what follows we discuss two cases that imply such a bound. First, we consider the
case where the bound is a consequence of limited intermediation possibilities. This
case is close to the model proposed by Laitenberger (1996) where the bound comes
from the scarcity of commodities. However, the level of transaction costs in Laiten-
berger (1996) is speciﬁed exogenously. The second case has no counterpart in the
literature and replace limited intermediation by making the bound to be a conse-
quence of a strong disutility for effort.
16If f : [0,∞) → R is a differentiable function, the differential of f is denoted by ∇f .14 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
3.2. Limited intermediation


















is said physically feasible if






















• asset markets clear, i.e.,




























It is trivial to exhibit an exogenous upper-bound on the consumption allocations


















In particular, Assumption 2.6 implies that each agent satisﬁes a non-satiation as-
sumption at each feasible consumption plan.









is said to have limited intermediation if the production set Zi of each agent i is
bounded.
If the production possibilities of each agent is bounded then it is possible to ex-
hibit an exogenous bound on portfolio allocations that are physically feasible.
PROPOSITION 3.1 If an economy has limited intermediation then the set of physi-
cally feasible allocations is bounded.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 15









with limited intermediation. It follows that





























is the maximum level of transactions that can be implemented by the labor market.
Q.E.D.
There is another natural situation where an exogenous bound on portfolios can
be exhibited.
3.3. Effort versus consumption
We recall that an allocation a = (ai)i∈I is individually rational if








If agent i does not participate to any market, neither consumption nor labor mar-
ket, he gets the payoff Πi(ei
0,0,ei
1). The set of individually rational and physically






We propose to replace the assumption that the volume of intermediation of each
agent is limited by the assumption that agents need a huge effort to intermediate
large amounts of ﬁnancial activities.








i∈I .16 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
An agent i is said to exhibit strong disutility for effort if there is no physically feasible
consumption that can compensate the effort for intermediating an arbitrarily large










PROPOSITION 3.2 If every agent in an economy exhibits strong disutility for effort
then the set of individually rational and physically feasible allocations is bounded.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2: Assume by contradiction that the set of individually
rational and physically feasible allocations is not bounded. Then there exists an
unbounded sequence of allocation (an)n satisfying18





Each consumption allocation xn = (xi
n)i∈I is physically feasible and in particular we
have
(3.13) ∀i ∈ I, 0 ¶ x
i
n ¶ e
where e = (e0,e1) is the aggregate intertemporal endowment. By market clearing of














Since the sequence (an)n is unbounded, we must have that the sequence of produc-
tion allocations (zn)n∈N is unbounded. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can





n  = ∞.
Since for each n, the allocation an is individually rational, we must have













Since the function (x0, x1)  → Πi(x0,z, x1) is strictly increasing for any z, it follows
from (3.13) that






















17If K is a ﬁnite set then       represents the norm deﬁned by  y  =
 
k∈K |yk| for each vector
y = (yk)k∈K in RK.












The intertemporal consumption plan (xi
0,n,(xi
1,n(s))s∈S) is denoted by xi
n. The production allocation
(zi
n)i∈I is denoted by zn.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 17
3.4. Existence result
If it is possible to exhibit an exogenous bound on individually rational and phys-
ically feasible allocations, then existence of a competitive equilibrium follows from
standard ﬁxed-point arguments. The only novelty is to show that it is possible to
clear at t = 0 via competitive prices, the three markets: commodities, assets and
labor. Actually we propose to show that under condition (b) of Assumption 2.5 (i.e.,
the payoff function is concave and strictly decreasing in production) the economy
has either limited intermediation or agents exhibit strong disutility for effort.
PROPOSITION 3.3 Consider an economy satisfying the aforementioned assumptions.
Every agent i has either limited intermediation in the sense that Zi is bounded, or
exhibits strong disutility for effort. In particular, the set of individually rational and
physically feasible allocations is bounded.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3: Assume now that there exists an agent i whose pro-
duction set Zi is not bounded. Let (zn)n∈N be a sequence in Zi such that
lim
n→∞
 zn  = ∞.
Passing to a subsequence if necessary, one can assume that there exists at least
one asset j such that the sequence (zn(j))n∈N is strictly increasing and unbounded
(in particular converges to ∞). We let ξn be the vector in RJ
+ deﬁned by ξn =
zn(j)1{j}.19 Since the function z  → Πi
0(e0,z,e1) is decreasing, we have





Since the function h  → Πi







implying that agent i exhibits strong disutility for effort. Q.E.D.
As a consequence, we can state our main result.
THEOREM 3.1 There exists a competitive equilibrium ((p,q,κ),a) with non-negative
transaction costs, i.e., κ ∈ RJ
+.
19If K is a ﬁnite set and H is a subset of K then 1H denotes the vector y = (yk)k∈K in RK deﬁned by
yk = 1 if k ∈ H and yk = 0 elsewhere.
20Let f : [0,∞) → R be a concave and strictly decreasing function. For every increasing sequence
(xn)n∈N converging to ∞ one must have limn f (xn) = −∞. Indeed, since the sequence converges to ∞,
for n large enough we have xn ¾ 1. It implies by concavity that f (xn) ¶ f (0)+ xn[f (1) − f (0)]. Since
f is strictly decreasing we have f (1)− f (0) < 0 and we get the desired result.18 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
Our proof of Theorem 3.1 is based on a limiting argument. We ﬁrst state that
existence is ensured when the sets of actions are bounded.21
PROPOSITION 3.4 Assume that each action set Ai is bounded. Then, there exists a
competitive equilibrium ((p,q,κ),a) with non-negative transaction costs, i.e., κ ∈
RJ
+.
We subsequently consider a sequence of suitably truncated economies and apply
Proposition 3.4 to obtain a sequence of competitive equilibria for the corresponding
truncated economies. The ﬁnal argument amounts to show that there exists a trun-
cated economy for which every competitive equilibrium is actually an equilibrium
of the initial economy.















of individually rational and physically feasible allocations is bounded. We ﬁx an
integer n ∈ N and we propose to truncate the economy   in a suitable manner, such

































where e1(ℓ) = max{e1(s,ℓ): s ∈ S} for each ℓ ∈ L1;

























We can apply Proposition 3.4 to each economy  n to get a sequence
(πn,an)n∈N
21The proof of Proposition 3.4 is postponed to Section 4.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 19








of individually rational and physically feasible allocations is bounded, there exists




















We let ν ≡ n0 + 1. It follows from standard arguments based on the concavity of
each expected payoff function Πi that (πν,aν) is actually a competitive equilibrium
of the initial economy  . Q.E.D.










satisfying the list of assumptions of this paper and such that the sets X i, Θi, Φi and
Zi are compact. We let Price0 be the auctioneer’s action set at t = 0 where22




+ :  π0  ≡  p0 + q + κ  ¶ 1}.
Since the vector (0,0,0) belongs to the price set Price0, we follow Bergstrom (1976)
by considering the following slack function
∀π0 = (p0,q,κ) ∈ Price0, γ(π0) = 1− π0 .
We let Price1 be the auctioneer’s action set at t = 1 where
Price1 = {p ∈ R
L1
+ :  p  = 1}.
We let Price be the set of auctioneer’s intertemporal actions deﬁned by
Price = Price0×[Price1]
S.
We slightly modify each agent’s budget set as follows: for each agent i and price
family π = (π0,π1) with π0 = (p0,q,κ) and π1 = (p1(s))s∈S, we let Bi
γ(π) be the set
of all actions a = (a0,a1) with







22We recall that if K is a ﬁnite set then       represents the norm deﬁned by  y  =
 
k∈K |y(k)| for
each y = (y(k))k∈K in RK.20 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
and a1 = (x1(s))s∈S where x1(s) ∈ X i
1 such that the following budget constraints are
satisﬁed:
(4.1) p0   x0 +(q +κ) θ ¶ p0   e
i
0 +(q −κ) ϕ +κ z +γ(π0)
and for each state s,
(4.2) p1(s)  x1(s)+ V(p1(s),s) ϕ ¶ p1(s)  e
i
1(s)+ V(p1(s),s) θ.
The function γ has suitably been chosen in order to obtain the following continuity
result.
LEMMA 4.1 The correspondence Bi
γ is continuous on the set Price for each agent i.
PROOF: Upper semi-continuity is not an issue. To establish lower semi-continuity
the only difﬁculty amounts to show that the strict modiﬁed budget set βi
γ(π) is non-
empty for every price π ∈ Price where βi
γ(π) is the subset of all actions a in Bi
γ(π)
such that the inequalities in (4.1) and (4.2) are strict. Fix a price π ∈ Price. Since
ei
1(s) belongs to the interior of X i
1 and p1(s) > 0, there exists xi









If γ(π0) > 0 then the action ai = (0, xi
1) belongs to the strict budget set βi
γ(π).
Assume now that γ(π0) = 1. Three cases are possible:
Case 1. The price p0 is not zero. Since ei
0 belongs to the interior of X i
0, there exists
xi
0 ∈ X i
0 such that





The action ai = (ai
0, xi





Case 2. The price p0 is zero but the price κ is not zero. This implies that there
exists at least one asset j ∈ J such that κj > 0. Since agent i has the productive
capacity to intermediate at least some units of asset j, there exists α > 0 small
enough such that23 zi = α1{j} belongs to Zi. The action ai = (ai
0, xi
1) belongs
to the strict budget set βi
γ(π) where ai
0 = (0,0,0,zi).
Case 3. The vector (p0,κ) is zero but the price q is not zero. This implies that there
exists at least one asset j ∈ J such that qj  = 0. Assume that qj > 0.24 Since
agent i can short-sell at least some units of asset j, we can choose ϕi = α1{j}
for α > 0 small enough such that




Such a choice of α implies that the action ai = (ai
0, xi




23We recall that if K is a ﬁnite set and H is a subset of K then 1H denotes the vector y = (y(k))k∈K in
RK deﬁned by y(k) = 1 if k ∈ H and y(k) = 0 elsewhere.
24We omit the similar argument for the case qj < 0.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 21
Q.E.D.
Using the continuity and convexity assumptions made on payoff functions to-
gether with the continuity of the modiﬁed budget correspondence, it is straight-
forward to apply Berge’s Maximum Theorem (see (Berge, 1963, pp. 115-116) or
(Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Theorem 16.31)) and obtain the upper semi-continuity
of the modiﬁed demand correspondence as deﬁned hereafter.
LEMMA 4.2 For each agent i, the correspondence di
γ is continuous on the set Price,
where
∀π ∈ Price, d
i
γ(π) ≡ argmax{Π
i(a) : a ∈ B
i
γ(π)}.
Moreover, for every π ∈ Price the set di
γ(π) is non-empty, convex and compact.
We let σ0 be the correspondence from
 
i∈I Ai
0 to Price0 representing the auction-














i]: π0 ∈ Price0
 
for all a0 = (ai














1(s)] : π1(s) ∈ Price1
 
for all x1(s) = (xi
1(s))i∈I.
We omit the standard arguments to prove that these correspondences are upper
semi-continuous.








1 with non-empty, compact and convex values.



















γ(π).22 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
It follows from Lemma (4.2) and (4.3) that the correspondence χ is upper semi-
continuous with compact convex and non-empty values. Applying Kakutani’s Fixed-
Point Theorem (see Kakutani (1941) or (Aliprantis and Border, 1999, Corollary 16.51)),
we obtain the existence of a ﬁxed-point (π,a) of the correspondence χ, i.e.,
(4.3) (π,a) ∈ χ(π,a).
We split the rest of the proof in several step.
LEMMA 4.4 We have γ(π0) = 0, i.e., the modiﬁed demand and the demand coincide.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.4: Assume by way of contradiction that γ(π0) > 0, i.e.,
0 < ǫ ≡ 1−
 
 p0 + q + κ 
 
.
We ﬁrst prove that commodity markets at t = 0 must clear. It follows from (4.3)
that
(4.4) π0 = (p0,q,κ) ∈ σ0(a0).
In particular, we have















for every commodity price   p0 in RL0 satisfying
   p0 + q + κ  ¶ 1
or equivalently










for every vector v ∈ RL0 satisfying  v  ¶ ǫ. As a consequence we obtain that com-
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Now it follows from (4.3) that













for every vector   κ ∈ RJ
+ satisfying    κ  ¶ 1. Since γ(π0) > 0, we must have
0 < η ≡ 1− κ .
It follows that we can choose   κ = κ + v for every vector v ∈ RJ









for every vector v ∈ RJ








Since commodity markets clear at t = 0, we must have
∀i ∈ I, x
i
0 ¶ e0.
Following Assumption 2.6, each agent i is non-satiated at (xi
0,zi) in terms of the
payoff Πi












Summing over i and using the fact that commodity markets clear, asset markets
clear and labor markets clear with free disposal, we must have







which leads to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Using the fact that the slack γ(π0) is zero, we can prove that commodity, asset
and labor markets clear at t = 0.
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PROOF OF LEMMA 4.5: It follows from (4.4) that
  p0  A+  q   B +   κ  C ¶ p0  A+q   B +κ  C




















Since the slack γ(π0) is zero, it follows from the ﬁrst period budget constraint that
p0  A+q   B +κ  C ¶ 0
implying that
∀(  p0,  q,  κ) ∈ Price0,   p0  A+  q   B +   κ  C ¶ 0.
Therefore, we must have that (A,B,C) belongs to the negative polar of Price0, i.e.,
A= 0, B = 0 and C ¶ 0.
Since commodity markets clear at t = 0, the budget set restriction for the ﬁrst period
must be binding.25 Therefore, we have
κ  C = 0.
Remind that κ belongs to RJ










Assume next that κj = 0. Since the function z  → Πi
0(xi
0,z) is strictly decreasing, we
must have zi














we get that the labor market for intermediation of asset j clears. Q.E.D.
Once we have proved that asset markets clear at the ﬁrst period, it is straightfor-
ward and standard to prove that commodity and labor markets clear at the second
period.












25See the argument used in the proof of Lemma 4.4.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 25
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.6: Fix a state s and observe that (4.3) implies
(4.5) π1(s) ∈ σs(x1(s)).
Therefore















for every vector   p ∈ Price1. Since asset markets clear, it follows from the budget



























This free-disposal market clearing implies that xi(s) ¶ e1(s) for each i. Following
Assumption 2.6 each agent i is non-satiated at xi
1(s) in terms of the utility Ui
1(s, ).





1(s)] ¶ V(p1(s),s) [θ
i −ϕ
i].









Since commodity markets clear with free-disposal, the claim is true provided that
the vector p1(s) is strictly positive. This follows from the fact that the function
Ui
1(s, ) is strictly increasing. Q.E.D.
In order to prove that (π,a) is a competitive equilibrium we still have to prove
that actions are optimal, i.e., ai ∈ di(π) for each agent i. Observe that (4.3) implies




The desired conclusion follows from Lemma 4.4.26 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
5. RELATED LITERATURE
In this section we argue that specifying exogenously the level of transaction costs,
as it is the case in the models proposed by Préchac (1996) and Markeprand (2008),
it raises a number of serious questions. Préchac (1996) and Markeprand (2008)
propose a model where no real resources are burnt in the process of transaction and
labor costs are negligible. They assume that there is one ﬁrm in the market that they
refer to as the brokerage house. Trade can only be implemented through this ﬁrm,
i.e., this ﬁrm has the monopoly of intermediating ﬁnancial activities. The brokerage
house is assumed to be privately owned by consumers/investors. Each agent i is
endowed with an equity share σi ∈ (0,1) that determines at equilibrium his share
of proﬁts. Using its monopoly power, the brokerage house ﬁxes a commission fee on
transactions that can be proportional to volume and/or value of assets traded. More
precisely, if an agent chooses a ﬁnancial strategy (θ,ϕ) and if the asset price is q,






where c ∈ RJ
+ and κ ∈ RJ
+. Préchac (1996) assumes that assets are non-degenerate
and positive, and consider the special case
c ∈ R
j
++ and κ = 0





Agents operate in a perfectly competitive environment taking not only prices as
given but also the proﬁt π of the brokerage house. We denote by Bi
M(q,p,π) the




0,θi,ϕi) satisfying the following
budget constraint at t = 0
(5.2) p0   x
i
0 +q  θ
i + c(q,θ
i,ϕ
i) ¶ p0   e
i
0 +q  ϕ
i +σ
iπ
and the same budget constraint at t = 1 and each state s that we consider in our
model, i.e.,
(5.3) p1(s)  x
i
1(s)+ V(p1(s),s) ϕ




Since labor costs are negligible in Préchac (1996) and Markeprand (2008), we de-

















26Actually Markeprand (2008) allows for a more general form of cost function. When the cost function
takes the form deﬁned by (5.1), then it is needed to assume that κj > 0 for each asset j since the price
qj may be zero at equilibrium.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 27
We now consider the deﬁnition of equilibrium adapted to this model and introduced
by Préchac (1996).
DEFINITION 5.1 A competitive equilibrium of the economy with a monopolistic bro-
kerage house is a family
{(p,q,π),(a
i)i∈I}
composed of prices (p,q), proﬁt π and an allocation (ai)i∈I of intertemporal actions
such that
(a) actions are optimal, i.e.,
(5.4) ∀i ∈ I, a
i ∈ argmax{V
i(a) : a ∈ B
i
M(p,q,π)}






















(c) asset markets clear, i.e.,


















5.1. Endogenous intermediation costs
When assets are non-degenerate and positive, Préchac (1996) proved that an
equilibrium with a monopolistic brokerage house always exists. A serious drawback
of the model proposed by Préchac (1996) is the lack of a rationale for the determi-
nation of intermediation costs. Since the brokerage house has the monopoly power
to choose the vector c = (cj)j∈J, an issue that naturally arises concerns with the
way the brokerage house chooses the vector c. An obvious answer is to say that c
is determined such that the brokerage house maximize its proﬁt. However, such a
modiﬁcation introduces serious difﬁculties in tackling the existence problem. This
is because, in such a setting, proﬁts depend on the equilibrium outcome which in
turn depends on the level of the chosen intermediation costs. Additional compli-
cations arise form the existence of multiple equilibria. To simplify things, consider
that the primitives of the economy are such that for each vector c, there is a unique
equilibrium and therefore the proﬁt function







j(c))28 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
is well-deﬁned. Following the idea proposed (although in a different framework)
by Bisin (1998), a simple and natural way to make c endogenous is to solve the
following maximization problem
argmax{π(c) : c ∈ (0,1)
J}.
It is not clear whether this maximization problem has always a solution. Moreover,
for economies exhibiting the non-existence phenomena à la Hart (1975), it follows







i(c)  = ∞.
This observation implies that it is far from clear that the proﬁt function c  → π(c)
is bounded from above in a neighborhood of 0. Therefore, one cannot conclude
whether non-existence phenomena à la Hart (1975) are ruled out when the inter-
mediation cost becomes endogenous.
5.2. Exogenous nominal costs
In Préchac (1996) intermediation costs are proportional to the value of the trans-
actions. In other words, costs are denominated in units of assets: in order to trade
one unit of asset j, each agent should give to the brokerage house cj units of the
same asset as a fee. This kind of intermediation costs ensures existence when assets
are non-degenerate and positive. Markeprand (2008) showed that in order to deal
with a more general asset structure including options, the cost function should sat-
isfy extra-properties since asset prices may be 0 at equilibrium. Markeprand (2008)





is such that κj > 0 for each asset j, then existence is guaranteed even if the assets
are not non-degenerate and positive. The only property that the payoff function of
each asset should satisfy is continuity with respect to commodity prices. This kind of
cost function proposed by Markeprand (2008) introduced an important difference
with respect to the model proposed by Préchac (1996). It implies that the budget
restriction at t = 0 is no more homogeneous of degree zero with respect to prices.
If we multiply the prices (p0,q) by 2, intermediation becomes less costly, while if
we divide the prices by 2 intermediation becomes more costly. This may lead to a
serious problem of interpretation and raises questions that already appear in the
literature of ﬁnancial markets with nominal assets. Since the level of prices matters,
who determines this level? Is it endogenously determined through market prices?
If not, is there any institution or agent that is ﬁxing the equilibrium level of prices?
When does the brokerage house choose the commission fee κ? Before or after ob-
serving the price level? Markeprand (2008) does not discuss the implications of hisENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 29
cost function on the homogeneity of period t = 0 budget restriction. More problem-
atic is the proof of the existence result found in his paper. The inherited nominal
feature due to the speciﬁcation of his cost function seems to play no role. Indeed,
it is claimed in Markeprand (2008) (see Section 3 p. 152) that, independently of




where prices at t = 0 satisfy the following conditions27
(5.8) p0 ∈ R
L0
+ ,  p0  = 1 and  q  ¶ 1.
We propose to show that this existence result is not correct. In order to prove that
a competitive equilibrium exists, the level of prices at t = 0 matters and should
depend on the nominal commission fee κ.
We consider the simplest case: one good per date, no uncertainty at t = 1 and one
asset delivering one unit of the unique good at t = 1. The cost function is deﬁned
as follows:
c(q,θ,ϕ) = κ(θ +ϕ).
To make the analysis closer to the notations in Markeprand (2008), we let z = θ −ϕ
denote the net trade in the asset market.28 Given a vector of commodity prices
p = (p0,p1), an asset price q and the (correctly anticipated) proﬁt π, the budget set
of agent i, denoted by Bi
M(p,q,π) is the set of all actions
(x0,z, x1) ∈ R+ ×R×R+
such that at t = 0




and at t = 1
(5.10) p1x1 ¶ p1(e
i
1 +z).







What differentiates agents are initial endowments. We will assume that there are
two agents I = {i0,i1}. Agent i0 has a larger endowment at t = 0 while agent i1
27We recall that if K is a ﬁnite set, we let  z  be the norm of a vector z = (zk)k∈K in RK be deﬁned by
 z  =
 
k∈K |zk|.
28We already saw that an agent will optimally choose (θ,ϕ) such that θϕ = 0. In other words, either
we have θ = 0 or ϕ = 0. This implies that the action (θ,ϕ) of an agent on the asset market can be
replaced by z = θ −ϕ.30 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS
has a larger endowment at t = 1. More precisely, we will assume that there exists










This economy satisﬁes all the assumptions of Theorem 1 in Markeprand (2008).








p0 = 1, p1 = 1 and |q| ¶ 1.
There is an obvious problem if κ ¾ 1.
PROPOSITION 5.1 If κ ¾ 1 then we can choose initial endowments such that there
does not exist a competitive equilibrium with prices satisfying (5.8).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1: Assume that κ ¾ 1 and choose M large enough such
that M > (κ+1)2. Since |q| ¶ 1 we must have q−κ ¶ 0. This implies that if agent i
chooses to short-sell one unit of the asset, he has to deliver q −κ units of the good
at t = 0 and 1 unit at t = 1. He is clearly better off not short-selling. Since the asset
market clears, there is no transaction in the market, i.e.,
z
i0 = z
i1 = 0 and π = 0.
However, agent i0 prefers to transfer wealth from period t = 0 to period t = 1.
Indeed, let   ai0(ǫ) be the alternative action
  a
i0(ǫ) = (  x
i0
0 (ǫ),  z





i0(ǫ) = ǫ,   x
i0
0 (ǫ) = e
i0
0 −(q +κ)ǫ and   x
i0
1 (ǫ) = e
i0
1 +ǫ.
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Actually, the normalization (5.8) proposed by Markeprand (2008) is problematic
even if there are no transaction costs.29
PROPOSITION 5.2 Assume that κ = 0 and e0 > e1 then there does not exist a com-
petitive equilibrium with prices satisfying (5.8).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.2: Assume that κ = 0. We have complete markets and
actually the optimal action ai = (xi
0,zi, xi
1) of agent i is also a solution to the maxi-
mization of Ui(x0, x1) under the constraint













Since markets clear, one must have
e0 = q
2e1.
If e0 > e1 we get the contradiction: q > 1. Q.E.D.
Let us replace the normalization (5.8) by the classical one30
(5.11) (p0,q,p1) ∈ R
3
+, p0 +q = χ0 and p1 = χ1
where χ0 > 0 and χ1 > 0. One may wonder if the arguments in Markeprand (2008)
can be corrected when considering this new normalization. The answer is yes, but
if κ is larger than χ0, the only possible equilibrium is no-trade. We don’t provide
the general proof of our claim. For the simplicity of the presentation, we prefer to
illustrate this result using the speciﬁc economy we have been considering.
PROPOSITION 5.3 Assume that κ ¾ χ0 then no-trade is the only possible competitive
equilibrium with prices satisfying (5.11).
29In Markeprand (2008), the existence is guaranteed only if κ > 0. However, in our speciﬁc example,
assets are numéraire. This implies that we can ﬁnd an exogenous bound on actions that is not binding at
equilibrium. If the arguments of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 in Markeprand (2008) were correct, existence
of an equilibrium satisfying the normalization (5.8) should be ensured even if there are no transaction
costs.
30In our speciﬁc example, the asset structure is non-degenerate and positive. If assets may have neg-
ative payoff as in Markeprand (2008), the normalization has to be adapted to the following one:
(p0,q,p1) ∈ R+ ×R×R+, p0 +|q| = χ0 and p1 = χ1.32 V . F. MARTINS-DA-ROCHA AND Y. VAILAKIS










+, p0 +q = χ0 and p1 = χ1.
Since q −κ ¶ χ0 −κ ¶ 0, no agent will short-sell the asset. By market clearing, we
must have no trade. Therefore no-trade is the only possible equilibrium. Actually, it











1)i∈I} with p0 = χ0 −q and p1 = χ1
is a competitive equilibrium. We only have to prove that for each agent i, no-trade
is the optimal action. Fix an agent i and assume by way of contradiction that there
exists a budget feasible action ai = (xi
0,zi, xi
1) such that Ui(xi) > Ui(ei). Since
q ¶ χ0 ¶ κ we have q −κ ¶ 0 implying that agent i will not short-sell the asset. As















We let   ai be the action (  xi






























































Q.E.D.ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS 33
Proposition 5.3 illustrates that the level of prices χ0 is a relevant parameter. If
it is not large enough (i.e., larger that the commission fee κ) only no-trade equi-
librium exists. Obviously, neither the brokerage house nor the agents have an in-
centive to preclude trade. The model proposed by Markeprand (2008) shares with
the model developed by Préchac (1996) the same drawback: the commission fee is
exogenous and the objective of the brokerage house is not explicitly modeled. But
in Markeprand (2008), a rationale for an endogenous level of prices is also missing.
Observe that our model suffers from none of the two drawbacks.
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